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INTRODUCTION. 
Possibly there is no other question now confronting our states- 
men, that assumes such an unsolvable indetermined aspect, as that of 
expansion" and its effect on our military organization. 
The United States is unskilled in provincial rule. She has ever 
shunned aggressive warfare, while conquest is certainly beyond her 
well tried spheres of action. Her military force has ever been held 
to the minimum necessary for home defense. She now has adopted pro- 
vincialism, without special preparation for the defense of the Province. 
She has planted the "Stars and Stripes" some ten thousand miles from 
home, without strengthening our defensive force for its protection. 
Where our flag goes, be the ethics what it may, our armies must go to 
protect. 
That our martial strength must be increased, is an obvious fact; 
but the manner of its increase and disposal of its newly organized 
forces are problems as yet unsolved. 
In treating this subject, the theories of the best tacticians, 
who have published articles within recent date, will be used as a 
back-ground. To these men the writer acknowledges his indebtedness. 
The reader is asked to accept only what seems logically deducted 
from the correlation of these theories, bearing in mind the fact that 
tacticians are at this date slow to publish their ideas or make con- 
jectures on a subject that is effected by so many external forces 
as that of "Expansion" or extending teri,itory. 
C. D. M. 
IS OUR PRESENT STRENGTH ADEQUATE? 
Tacticians, prior to the Hispano-American war, advanced the state- 
ment "that our present standing is insufficient for our defense." 
The statement was set forth by men who ranked first among the tacticians 
of the age. And we must certainly recognize the probability that 
they were in the best position to judge. The conjecture that we could 
successfully fight any of the larger nations, which was made by the 
same men, is hard for us to believe, since we have, so recently limit- 
ed one of the recognized powers of Europe. But these successes are 
apt to, erroneously applied to prove a doubtful position. We cannot 
conclude, from our successes from Mantlla and Santago de Cuba, that we 
have a predominant navy or that we can defend our nation against attaclz 
from stronger nations. It has been pointed out, by men of recognized 
tactical ability, that our flight is insignificant when compared with 
the navies of England, France, Germany or Russia; that we have no 
powerful coast defenses, and that our army is barely sufficient to 
garrison our few weak fortresses. These conditions are only the sore 
easily recognized since our "brush" with Spain. 
Let us review our condition. We have a regular army of about 
eighty five thousand men. We might expect some help from the "ation- 
al Guards", but cannot list them with any given strength. The value 
of "National Guards" is apt, too, tobe overdrawn as has been shown by 
our recent war. The officers Of our army were, prior to the Spanish 
War, unskilled in handling troops. 
A few of the minor officers had commanded troops in "brushes" 
with the Indians. The "National Guards" were even less ready for war 
and could be counted on for but little more than to suppress strikes 
and riots in their own states. 
As for our nayy, while we floated seven modern first-class battle- 
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ships, it is recognized by all naval officers to be insignificant in 
comparison with the navy of any of the five great Eastern powers. 
As for coast defenses we are unguarded. On the Atlantic sea 
board alone, as have been painted out by General Howard, we have fif- 
teen imsortaist cities must fall prey to an attack by sea. 
We have, however, a few natural and one social strength of which 
no other nation can boast. J. S. Pettit tells us nwe have little fear 
frON insision, owing to our isolated position and extensive domains." 
He goes on to show that Canada, our only possible enemy at land, is 
of a social condition that reassures our safety. Our extensive sea 
coast obliterates the idea of bombardment. The rough topographical 
condition, affords natural fortresses, behind which we can defend against 
all Europe, were she able to land. 
But better still, we have existing among our people a social con- 
dition that enables us to muster in, by call for volunteers, an army 
of any desired. strength, a condition which makes it absolutely impos- 
sible for other nations to determine our strength. With all of these 
advantages, however, we must suffer materially at the hands of a strong 
nation even though we could probably defend most of our territory. 
Our present conjecture, as a slight deduction from the above is, 
that, in the estimation of our best tacticians, our 
is even too small to defend with certainty our home 
many more fold too small -and inadequate must it 
-be, 
the Hiwaiian and Phillipine islands 
miles away. 
Effects of isolation. 
The effects that must follow from attempting to defend Isolated 
Possessions are very marked. In the first place the islands in ques- 
tions are four hundred in number, scattered over an area eighty degrees 
long and twenty degrees wide, with only one of them large enough to 
present strength 
possessions, How 
then, to defend 
the latter being ten thousand 
T 
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outreach the long range of Marine guns in extension. 
The climate is poorly adapted for American soldiers, as has been 
shown by recent campaigns in Luzon. So were all other conditions 
favorable it, would be impracticable to garrison the islands with suf- 
ficient array strength to defend them. She general lay of the islands, 
themselves, make internal defense impracticable, if possible. The 
coast line bears such a broad ratio to the area that the thrusts we 
might receive from sea cannot be parried off by land forces. 
The expense of supporting an army ten thousand miles from supplies, 
as an army station in the islands will be until civilization has had 
time to grow, would be so enormous as to render this means of defense 
a very costly one if desirable otherwise. The fact that we are so 
widely separated makes it tactically a poor practice to depend on 
landing an army in Luzon after hostilities were really begun. It 
would take a strong naval force to escort a transport through a stretch 
of waters frequented by an enemy's war ships. 
The Islands, themselves, being hostile now, cannot be depended 
on to remain friendly or even neutral should they ever become so, 
which, in Col. Boyle's mind, will not be for ten years hence. 
After all this, it would. be difficult to raise an army of siffi- 
cient strength to garrison the islands, were it deemed strategy to 
do so. Captain Mahan tell us "that the 
-islands are of no value to us 
unless they are all owned"or controlled. "If we own a few islands 
we must own them all in order to protect that few." To control four 
hundred islands scattered over so broad an area, would require an 
army one hundred thoudand strong could we furnish it. 
David Staar Jordan asserts that a majority of the United States 
soldiers, who have fought in the Phillipines, are themselves opposed 
to annexing those islands to the United States. Other men of less 
Prominence, but probably acquainted with the facts sufficiently to 
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make a valuable guess. Say that it will be impossible to raise an 
army stfficiently strong to garriosn the islands. Men that respond 
to the call for volunteers to fight over wars are not men who are 
willing to do garrison duty or become regular soldiers. This was 
well proven in the war with Spain. When the orders were issued to 
muster out ninety five regiments, and retain the rest to garrison 
Cuba and Porto-Rico, the volunteers were as wild to be among those to 
be mustered out as they had been to be sent to Santiago, when there 
was fighting to be done. Petition after petition followed each other 
to Washington protesting against the disposal of troops for garrison 
duty that had been mustered into fight the war with Spain. 
When we remember that it is novelty and love of adventure that 
sweeps our bright youths into the ranks, while there is warfare in 
progress, we must conclude that, when the fighting has subsided and 
there is no promise of adventure, we cannot expect the same men to 
enter the army to garrison islands ten thoudand miles from home, friends 
and native land, and in a land where the climate is oppressive and 
civilization lacking. 
In conclusion, then, the scattered condition of the islands, the 
enormous expense of maintaining an army so far from its source of 
supplies, the unfriendly attitude of the natives, together with the 
diTficulty of raising a sufficient force to garrison the islands, make 
it impracticable to depend on a standing army as a means of depending 
the islands. Since it is necessary to be able to defend a transport 
against any navy that might attack it, it is necessary, from a scien- 
tific strategical standpoint to leave a navy that is predominant to 
the navy of any country likely to become our enemy. 
The United States troops must be of sufficient strength on the 
Islands, however, to insure internal peace and dispel thoughts of 
invading, Luzon, the largest island, They can better be centralized 
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at Manilla from which all moves on till other islands must proceed, 
(as a base.) 
How must the Army change? 
The army must be reorganized to become adapted to the islands 
and their methods of fighting, and to best resist the oppressive heat 
of that hot climate and the infectious diseases peculiar to the tropics. 
Cavalry cannot do very much in so rough a country, neither can 
we rely on heavy field artillery, the defense must come through the 
infantry suported by rapid fire guns and other models of artillery 
easily transported from place to place. 
As I have pointed out, volunteers cannot be depended on as we 
must have forces ready to station on the islands as the first indica- 
tions of a war. The standing army should be increased to a strength 
suffiCient to provide this. With the exception of an army strong 
enough to preserve peae among the islanders, they should be kept in 
the southern part of the United States, where they will become acli- 
mated to a tropical climate. 
The officers should be given opportunity to handle troops in the 
formation and maneuvers of battle. 
Effect on Our 3avy. 
The problem 
-hen reduces itself to that of a naval proposition, 
the standing army, as we have been being insufficient to maintain our 
standing among nations. 
I believe it is conceded by all military engineers, who have 
given the subject a careful investigation, that a predominant navy is 
our only safe means of defense. 
The idea of defending by coast fortifications is, owing to the 
enormous extent of coast as compared with the area included, too 
foolish to be entertained by any tactician Although it is still ad- 
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vanced by a limited few who are apt to overrate the value of new 
con- 
trivances, such as "Sub-marine mines", torpedoes, Dynamite guns, 
etc., 
which are,as yet, in the experimental stage. 
We must therefore make the changes in our navy, that will insure 
safety against atttack from any other nation. In doing this, 
we should 
bear in mind the fact that our success with Spain, a fourth rat 
nation, 
must not be over-estimated. It has been said, by good authority, 
that we won, not by our strategy but by Spanish inferiority 
in sea- 
manship. 
I epitomize below the views of Admiral Columbi and Captain 
Mahan 
on the subject. The same opinion, I find upheld by nearly every 
tactician who has published his views regarding the matt-rs 
If the islands are to be a source of strength to us, we must 
first make then ours to defend. Admiral Columbi says, "We can 
do 
this only by a nredominant navy. If this predominant navy is 
not 
maintained, the islands can only be sources of strategical 
weakness 
putting a check on aspiration to influence international councils, 
which we must eertainly expect to see increased, and make the 
United 
States more hesitating beause of the ease with which her islands 
can be rent from her and her consciousness of the fact, 
Had Spain 
Possessed a predominant navy, the United States could 
never have attempt- 
ed, much less succeeded, in her attach on Cuba, Porto-Rico 
and the 
Phillipine Islands. In like manner, it will be hopeless for 
the 
United States to dream of h retaining her new possessions 
in war 
with a country which has a navy superior to her own. 
There is no 
plainer document than that of a predominant navy. 
There is a natural 
hesitation in pushing things to their extreme point, yet 
I fear they 
must be so pushed or let alone. People often say 
that such an island 
will control such a harbor. It is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mis- 
take." Other conditions are implied. The islands across the Pacific 
ent Ittr, 
115n .t 
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control nothing till we control them. 
"Local protection such as strong forts and great preparations 
of harbors will avail but little, why? 
First, the expense put into such works is only an incentive to 
the enemy leading them on to destroy them. Second, it will not be 
attacked by an inferior force, hence a subdueing of the works in the 
end. 
If there could be a resting place short of a predominant navy, 
which I do not believe there is for a country with outlying dependen- 
cies, I think it would be found in the localization of a defensive 
navy." By this the Admiral means, that instead of a strong navy of 
battle-ships, we night have a fleet of gun boats, which thougisluggish, 
float a strong battery and can creep from place to place. 
The same author thinks that there is much promised by the torpedo 
boat, but more recent writers seem to think that this Marine device, 
is, as yet, unproven in its value. 
Mr. Rallis makes the following statement as to the torpedo boat 
and other mattial devices for sea combat, that have not as yet, emerged 
from the experimental stage. "Cruisers, like the' Columbia' and 
'Minneapolis' had no real test: as scouts, they are too large; as 
fighters they are of no real value against an armored fleet. As for 
the Torpeto its value has not been determined, the principal danger 
being their proclivities to explode on our own hands, injuring friend 
instead of foe." In one case a Spanish torpedo boat was defeated by 
an Atherican yacht. "Our search lights had but little trouble in loca 
ting torpedo boats, and our former fear for these vessels has quite 
subsided." We cannot therefore draw conclusions as to the place of 
these new untried devices in future warfare. 
The conclusions would be that the United States must increase 
her naval fleet of modern battle-ships to equal or excel that of any 
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possible enemy. What does this mean? Let us sum up the standing as 
to naval strength of the great European powers, and compare them with 
that of the United States. According to Henry 7. Raymond, "We have, 
a total of sixty-one modern ships in actual service of which thirteen 
are fighting ships, with nineteen more to be added within eighteen 
lonths of which five are"fighters"- thirty-five more to be added pos- 
sibly, within three years, of which seven belong to the class of ar- 
mored vessels. The United States has then a navy in Esse and in Posse 
of one hundred and fifteen ships, of which fifty will be torpedo boats 
and torpedo catchers." 
Fred. T. Jone makes a comparative resume of the navies of England, 
Germany and Russia, the recognized leading powers of the world. Ac- 
cording to his classification a first rate battle -ship must conform 
to most of the following conditions: 
" (a) The vitals so protected that no projectile stands a chance 
of reaching t'nem, even at close range. 
(b) The main ornament must consist of most powerful armor -piercing 
guns, these must have central loading positions and be generally not 
liable to be easily put out of action by small shell. 
(c) The secondary ornament must be well protected and powerful. 
(d) The ship must generally be able to beat down the fire of a 
ship of lower class. " 
The following table gives the totals of the ships of the four 
great powers according to his classification. (Bigd) = 
9 
Bate England France Germany Russia 
Bldg Bldg Bldg Bldg 
1st. 13 + 14 5 + 2 0 + 0 4 + 0 
2nd. 12 + 10 4 + 0 7 + 7 8 + 6 
3rd. 10 + 4 14 + 10 0 + 1 2 + 2 
4th 42 + 0 15 + 4 13 + 0 10 + 0 
5th 25 + 0 14 + 1 9 + 0 6 + 6 
6th 55 + 0 7 + 0 2 + 0 3 + 3 
7th 29 + 2 11 + 0 13 + 2 4 0 
Aggregate 
184 + 30 80 + 17 44 + 10 57 + 21 
The above table shows how insignificant the American fleet is, 
when c:mpared with other great powers. There is one thing, however, 
that we must not forget in summing up our strength, that is the supe- 
riority of our American seamen, which our past wars from the engage- 
ments of Paul Jones to the battle of T.lanilla show to unexcelled by 
any other nation. 
Admitting this but being careful not to overrate it, we must 
conclude that safety to our new possessions can be insured only by 
increasing our navy to the equal of that of either Germany or Russia, 
twisting in the neutrality of England and not forgetting, the while, 
that those nations are much nearer the Phillipine islands than are 
we, 
CHARLES D.MONTGOM7RY. 
